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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
No. 10-1194 
____________ 
 
DENNIS L. CARLSON,  
             Appellant 
v. 
 
TOWNSHIP OF LOWER ALLOWAYS CREEK; MAYOR WALLACE BRADWAY;  
MEMBERS OF TOWNSHIP COMMITTEE OF LOWER ALLOWAYS CREEK; 
JOHN DOES 1-10 (fictitious names), jointly, severally, and/or in the alternative  
______________ 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 06-3779)  
District Judge: Honorable Robert B. Kugler 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 28, 2011 
______________ 
 
Before: SLOVITER, GREENAWAY, JR., and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed:  September 29, 2011) 
 
______________ 
OPINION 
______________ 
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GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge 
 Appellant Dennis Carlson (“Carlson”) sued the Township of Lower Alloways 
Creek (the “Township”), Mayor Wallace Bradway (“Bradway”), and members of the 
Lower Alloways Creek Township Committee (the “Committee”) (collectively, 
“Appellees”).  His initial complaint contained claims of age discrimination and retaliation 
in violation of the Age Discrimination and Employment Act (“ADEA”) and the New 
Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“NJLAD”), and in violation of the New Jersey 
Tenure Statute, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:9-154.6.   
An initial round of dispositive motions led to Carlson‟s amended complaint which 
added new claims of breach of contract, misrepresentation, breach of the duty of good 
faith and fair dealing, and denial of due process.  A second round of dispositive motions 
led to summary judgment for Appellees.  The District Court denied Carlson‟s motions for 
reconsideration of its grant of summary judgment and, in the alternative, to amend his 
amended complaint.  Carlson filed a timely notice of appeal of the District Court‟s 
summary judgment and reconsideration rulings.
1
  He contends that there is sufficient 
evidence to allow a reasonable juror to conclude the Township‟s proffered reasons for 
terminating Carlson were pretextual.  We disagree.  For the reasons explained below, we 
                                                     
1
 Although Carlson refers in his Notice of Appeal to the District Court‟s initial summary 
judgment ruling following his initial complaint.  His current appeal is limited to the 
retaliation claims under the NJLAD and ADEA.    
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will affirm the District Court‟s judgment.   
I. BACKGROUND 
We write primarily for the parties and recount only the essential facts.   
On October 3, 2000, the Township Committee (the “Committee”) adopted a 
motion to appoint Carlson as Temporary Public Works Manager, effective through 
December 31, 2000.  On October 30, 2000, the Committee and Carlson entered into an 
employment contract which provided that Carlson would serve as Superintendent of 
Public Works from January 1, 2001 through December 31, 2003.   
According to Carlson, during and after the campaign for the Committee‟s election 
in late 2003 and early 2004, Committee persons Dale G. Donelson (“Donelson”) and 
Richard Harris (“Harris”) made comments expressing their intent to get older employees 
out of the Township Police Department and Public Works Department.  In early 2004, the 
Committee asked certain Township employees in the Department of Public Works if they 
were interested in early retirement.  In December 2003 or January 2004, Carlson 
complained to Donelson and Harris regarding his concern that certain workers felt 
pressured into early retirement.   
In December 2004, the Township filed disciplinary charges against Carlson.  The 
allegations included: 
(1) failing to properly and timely perform his job duties; (2) lying to 
Deputy Mayor Richard Harris regarding an incident in which Township 
employees damaged someone‟s flowers; (3) behaving inappropriately 
toward other employees; (4) demonstrating a poor management style; [(5)] 
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and using incorrect calculations to justify keeping garbage collection in-
house. 
 
(App. at 10.)  In March 2005, the Township began a hearing on the disciplinary charges 
against Carlson, but did not complete the hearing.  The charges were not pursued further 
and no disciplinary action was imposed on Carlson.   
On July 14, 2005, Carlson filled out an Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (“EEOC”) Charge Information Questionnaire.  In it, he contended that the 
Township was trying to discharge him because of his age and as a form of retaliation, 
though he did not specify in the questionnaire the actions prompting the alleged 
retaliation.  He cited the Township‟s December 17, 2004 disciplinary charges against him 
as the last date of harm.  Carlson further alleged that the Township was motivated by the 
impending date of his eligibility for tenure and his refusal to be “partial.”2  (App. at 519.) 
On August 26, 2005, Mayor Bradway and Committee member Robert Drummond 
(“Drummond”) met with Carlson.  They informed Carlson that David Hinchman 
(“Hinchman”), an employee who had worked for Carlson and had testified against 
Carlson at the March 2005 disciplinary hearing, had reported that Carlson was retaliating 
against him because of that testimony.  Mayor Bradway and Drummond told Carlson that 
such retaliation was illegal and sent him a memorandum memorializing the meeting 
which Carlson declined to sign.  Carlson indicated to them that he would instead submit a 
                                                     
2
 Carlson does not define “partial” in his EEOC Questionnaire; however, he has not 
raised the issue on appeal and it has no impact on our analysis. 
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written response.  Shortly after this meeting, Drummond approached Mayor Bradway and 
stated that he believed Carlson should be terminated. 
On August 27, 2005, Carlson filed a grievance.  The grievance alleged that the 
August 26, 2005 meeting was harassment and retaliation for Carlson‟s “expectation of 
the Public Works employees to provide an efficient and effective service to the residents 
of this and the other Townships we serve.”  (App. at 524.)  In the grievance, Carlson also 
stated that he had “filed charges with the E.E.O.C.”3 (Id.)  
On September 2, 2005, Drummond and Mayor Bradway sent Carlson a letter in 
response to his grievance advising him that he was “required to report to, be directed by 
and perform duties as directed by the Mayor, or when practical, by the Township 
Committee.”  (Id. at 526.)  The letter also stated that because the August 26 meeting was 
“part of [Carlson‟s] obligation and not a disciplinary action,” the grievance procedure 
was not applicable.  (Id.)  In addition, the letter noted that Carlson‟s grievance stated that 
he “ha[d] „filed with the EEOC,‟” and based on that information, “the Township 
underst[ood]” that he had “decided not to further pursue any internal mechanisms for 
dispute resolution that may be available. . .”  (Id. at 527.) 
On September 6, 2005, Carlson requested that his grievance  be scheduled in open 
session at the September 20, 2005 Township meeting.  On September 12, 2005, the 
                                                     
3
 Although Carlson filled out his EEOC Questionnaire on July 14, 2005, he filed his 
EEOC charge in September, 2005. 
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Committee denied this request.  In the denial, Mayor Bradway and the Committee 
explained, in part, that, 
 [p]ursuant to OPMA [the Open Public Meetings Act], matters involving 
litigation or anticipated litigation cannot be discussed in open public 
session . . . OPMA precludes discussion of any matters, such as these, 
involving confidential personnel matters and/or which may intrude on 
privacy concerns or other employees.   
 
(Id. at 530.)  That same day, Carlson also received notice that the Committee would meet 
on September 20, 2005 regarding his employment.  On September 20, 2005, the 
Committed unanimously adopted a resolution to immediately remove Carlson from his 
position, pursuant to Township Code, Section 32-18.
4
  
On March 9, 2006, the EEOC issued a determination finding reason to believe that 
the Township had violated the ADEA.  On August 11, 2006, Carlson filed his initial civil 
complaint in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey against the 
Township, Mayor Bradway, and members of the Township Committee.  In his complaint, 
                                                     
4
 Section 32-18 of the Lower Alloways Creek Code reads 
Removal from office. 
 The Superintendent of Public Works may be removed by a three-fifths vote 
of the Township Committee.  The resolution of removal shall become 
effective three (3) months after its adoption by the Township Committee.  
The Township Committee may provide that the resolution shall have 
immediate effect; provided, however, that the Township Committee shall 
cause to be paid to the Superintendent of Public Works forthwith any 
unpaid balance of his salary and his salary for the next three (3) calendar 
months following the adoption of the resolution.   
(App. at 296.) 
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Carlson alleges a violation of the ADEA; Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; a 
violation of the NJLAD, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-1 et seq. (including allegations that 
Mayor Bradway aided and abetted the discriminatory acts of the Township Committee); 
and a violation of the New Jersey Tenure Statute, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:9-154.6.   
On March 28, 2008, the Appellees filed a motion for partial summary judgment of 
Carlson‟s tenure statute claim and all claims against Mayor Bradway and the Committee.   
 On December 2, 2008, the District Court granted Appellees‟ motion regarding 
Carlson‟s Tenure Statute claim and all claims against members of the Township 
Committee, but denied Appellees‟ motion with respect to Carlson‟s claim that Mayor 
Bradway aided and abetted a violation of the NJLAD.   
 On December 8, 2008, Carlson filed an amended complaint, adding new claims of 
breach of contract, misrepresentation, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, 
and denial of due process.  On March 31, 2009, the Township and Mayor Bradway filed 
motions for summary judgment.  On May 18, 2009, Carlson filed a cross-motion for 
partial summary judgment.   
On August 12, 2009, the District Court granted Appellees‟ motions for summary 
judgment and denied Carlson‟s cross-motion for partial summary judgment.  It found that 
the Township did not breach the employment contract with Carlson either by terminating 
him in the middle of his term or by failing to enact an ordinance making the tenure statute 
applicable to him.  The Court also found that the Township‟s failure to enact an 
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ordinance as provided under the tenure statute, its termination of Carlson without notice 
and an opportunity to be heard, and its termination without cause were not breaches of 
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  Finally, the Court granted summary 
judgment in favor of the Appellees on Carlson‟s misrepresentation, intentional infliction 
of emotional distress, and due process claims.   
The District Court also granted Appellees‟ motion for summary judgment on 
Carlson‟s retaliation claims under the ADEA and NJLAD.  The Court found that 
although Carlson had presented a prima facie case of discrimination under the statutes, 
Appellees had articulated several legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for terminating 
Carlson, and he failed to offer evidence that the defendants‟ proffered reasons for his 
termination, including his alleged inadequate job performance and failure to comply with 
the Committee‟s directives, were pretextual.  Carlson appealed the District Court‟s 
January 4, 2010 order denying his Motion for Reconsideration of its grant of summary 
judgment for his ADEA and NJLAD retaliation claims.  
II.  JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 
1367.  We have jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  “We review a denial of a 
motion for reconsideration for abuse of discretion, but we review the District Court‟s 
underlying legal determinations de novo and factual determinations for clear error.”  
Howard Hess Dental Labs. Inc. v. Dentsply Intern., Inc., 602 F.3d 237, 246 (3d Cir. 
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2010) (citing Max‟s Seafood Café v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 673 (3d Cir. 1999)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  We exercise plenary review over the District Court‟s 
grant of summary judgment and apply the same standard that the District Court should 
have applied.  Howley v. Mellon Fin. Corp., 625 F.3d 788, 792 (3d Cir. 2010).  We view 
the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.  Jakimas v. Hoffmann-La 
Roche, Inc., 485 F.3d 770 (3d Cir. 2007).  Summary judgment is appropriate when the 
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a) (amended Dec. 1, 
2010). 
III.  ANALYSIS 
We apply the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 
411 U.S. 792 (1973) to ADEA claims.
5
  See Smith v. City of Allentown, 589 F.3d 684 
(3d Cir. 2009).  New Jersey also uses the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting scheme for 
discrimination cases.  See Jakimas v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 485 F.3d 770, 788 (3d 
Cir. 2007) (“the standards applied to ADEA cases are applied to age claims under the 
                                                     
5
 The anti-retaliation provision of the ADEA provides:  
It shall be unlawful for an employer to discriminate against any of his 
employees . . . because such individual . . . has opposed any practice made 
unlawful by this section, or because such individual . . . has made a charge, 
testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, 
proceeding, or litigation under this chapter.  
29 U.S.C. § 623(d). 
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NJLAD unless there is divergent language between the statutes.”) (citing Monaco v. Am. 
Gen. Assurance Co., 359 F.3d 296, 305 (3d Cir. 2004)). 
To establish a prima facie claim for retaliation, a plaintiff must show that: “(1) he 
was engaged in protected activities; (2) the employer took an adverse employment action 
after or contemporaneous with the employee‟s protected activity; and (3) a causal link 
exists between the employee‟s protected activity and the employer‟s adverse action.”  
Glanzman v. Metro. Mgmt. Corp., 391 F.3d 506, 508-09 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Farrell v. 
Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 279 (3d Cir. 2000)).   
If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of retaliation, under McDonnell 
Douglas, “the burden shifts to the employer to advance a legitimate, non-retaliatory 
reason for its conduct.”  Moore v. City of Philadelphia, 461 F.3d 331, 342 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(quoting Krouse v. Am. Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 500-01 (3d Cir. 1997)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  “The employer‟s burden at this stage is relatively light: it is 
satisfied if the defendant articulates any legitimate reason for the [adverse employment 
action]; the defendant need not prove that the articulated reason actually motivated the 
[action].”  Shellenberger v. Summit Bancorp, Inc., 318 F.3d 183, 189 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(quoting Krouse, 126 F.3d at 500) (internal quotation marks omitted).  If the employer 
does so, the burden shifts back to the employee, who “must produce sufficient evidence 
to allow a reasonable fact finder to conclude that the proffered reasons for not rehiring 
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him are a pretext for illegal discrimination or retaliation.”  Sarulla v. United States Postal 
Service, 352 F.3d 789, 799-800 (3d Cir. 2003).   
A plaintiff may meet that burden, defeating a summary judgment motion, by 
providing evidence that would allow a fact finder reasonably to “(1) disbelieve the 
employer‟s articulated legitimate reasons; or (2) believe that an invidious discriminatory 
reason was more likely than not the motivating or determinative cause of the employer‟s 
action.”  Id.  (citing Jones v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 198 F.3d 403, 413 (3d Cir. 
1999) (quoting Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 (3d Cir. 1994)).   
Here, the District Court held that Carlson established a prima facie case of age 
discrimination.
6
  The District Court then found that the Township met its burden by 
articulating several legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for Carlson‟s termination:  “(1) 
he failed to perform his job duties competently; (2) he was a poor manager who harassed 
subordinates; and (3) he failed to follow the directives of Township Committee 
Members.”  (App. at 26.)  The Court found that Carlson, however, failed to meet his 
burden to produce sufficient evidence of pretext to survive summary judgment.  We 
agree. 
As we have recognized, proving pretext “places a difficult burden on the plaintiff.”  
Kautz v. Met-Pro Corp., 412 F.3d 463, 467 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 
                                                     
6
 Carlson‟s „protected activity,‟ which the District Court acknowledged, consisted of 
Carlson‟s objections to the harassment of older Township employees and submitting a 
charge information questionnaire to the EEOC.  (App. at 25.)   
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765).  To survive summary judgment, a plaintiff must put forward “such weaknesses, 
implausabilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer‟s 
proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally 
find them unworthy of credence.”  Kautz, 412 F.3d at 467 (internal citations and 
quotation marks omitted).   
Carlson identifies three issues which he believes would allow a reasonable fact-
finder to infer that the Township‟s proffered legitimate reasons were pretexual.7   
First, Carlson argues that the sequence of events leading up to his termination varied 
from the Township‟s usual practices.  Specifically, he claims that Drummond‟s “sudden 
request” to fire him on or about August 29, 2005, casts doubt on the legitimacy of the 
Township‟s asserted justification because his “termination resolution was prepared at an 
unofficial meeting held between just two of the five Township Committee members and 
the Township‟s attorneys.”  (Appellant‟s Br. at 26.)   
In support of this notion, Carlson cites Atlantic City Convention Ctr. Auth. v. 
South Jersey Pub. Co., Inc., 637 A.2d 1261 (N.J. 1994) for its pronouncement that New 
Jersey‟s Open Public Meeting Act (“OPMA” or “the Act”) “requires adequate written 
notice of at least forty-eight hours to the public of all regularly-scheduled governmental 
meetings and any special meetings.”  Id. at 1265 (citing N. J. STAT. ANN. § 10:4-8(d), -
                                                     
7
 Appellees dispute the District Court‟s finding that Carlson presented a prima facie case 
of retaliation.  (Appellees‟ Br. at 5.)  We need not undertake this analysis because 
assuming, arguendo, that Carlson establishes a prima facie case, he cannot carry his 
burden to demonstrate pretext.  
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9(a)).  Although “[w]e have recognized that [a] violation of company policy can 
constitute a pretext for unlawful discrimination under certain circumstances,” Anderson 
v. Wachovia Mortg. Corp., 621 F.3d 261, 278 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Goosby v. Johnson 
& Johnson Med., Inc., 228 F.3d 313, 322 (3d Cir. 2000)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted), Carlson does not present evidence that this was a meeting of the Township 
Committee and that it therefore should have been so noticed.  Carlson does not present 
evidence that in instructing the attorneys to prepare a resolution, any Committee 
procedures were violated.
8
  The Committee voted on September 20, 2005 not to renew its 
contract with Dennis Carlson.  (App. at 280.) 
Carlson also claims that the temporal proximity between his notice to the 
Township, through his grievance request, of his EEOC charge on August 29, 2005 and 
his termination on September 20, 2005 “should have been afforded greater weight as 
highly suggestive evidence of temporal causation.”  (Appellant‟s Br. at 24.)  The District 
                                                     
8
 Carlson also claims that, as direct evidence of the Township‟s “retaliatory animus,” 
(Appellant‟s Br. at 28), the Township “refus[ed] his exercise of a guaranteed internal 
grievance process, expressly in part because he had filed with the EEOC.”  Id. at 28-29.  
Carlson‟s argument fails.  In its letter in response to Carlson‟s grievance, the Township 
stated that because Carlson‟s August 26, 2005 meeting with Mayor Bradway and Mr. 
Drummond was “part of [his] obligation and not a disciplinary action . . . no grievance 
procedure is applicable.”  (App. at 526.)   
Carlson does not present evidence to the contrary, nor does the grievance policy in 
the record.  (See App. at 319.)  The Township acknowledged in its response that Carlson 
had “filed with the EEOC;” however, this statement alone is not sufficient to suggest that 
the Township‟s denial of his grievance was improper and was contrary to Township 
policy.  
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Court found that this temporal proximity, approximately one month apart,
9
 supported a 
prima facie case of retaliation by supporting an allegation of causation.  Carlson v. Twp. 
of Lower Alloways Creek, No. 06-3779, 2009 WL 2496523 (D.N.J. August 12, 2009).  
Although we are not limited to considering temporal proximity in the prima facie step of 
the McDonnell Douglas analysis, see Farrell, 206 F.3d at 286-87, (“nothing about the 
McDonnell Douglas formula requires us to ration the evidence between one stage or the 
other”), that proximity alone does not, in this case, allow for the reasonable inference that 
the Township‟s explanations were fabricated.  For example, in Farrell, reversing 
summary judgment for failure to show a prima facie case, the court found that “taken as a 
whole, the behavior of [a department director], the timing of Farrell‟s termination and the 
inconsistencies she raised in [the defendant‟s] explanation for her termination [we]re 
sufficient to create the required inference.”  Farrell, 206 F.3d at 286.  Unlike Farrell, 
Carlson has not presented sufficient evidence to create the required inference of pretext.  
                                                     
9
 Carlson posits that the temporal proximity of his protected action and adverse activity is 
closer to two to three days because Carlson filed his grievance on August 27, 2005 and 
Drummond approached Mayor Bradway about firing Carlson within a few days after that.  
Drummond testified in his deposition that he approached Mayor Bradway about firing 
Carlson prior to his August 29, 2005 receipt of the grievance.  Even accepting Carlson‟s 
assertion and assuming that Drummond was aware of the grievance when he approached 
Bradway about firing Carlson, we do not believe that a two to three day proximity alone 
shows “such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or 
contradictions in [the Township‟s] proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a 
reasonable factfinder could rationally find them „unworthy of credence.‟” Krouse, 126 
F.3d at 504 (quoting Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 765). 
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Carlson next claims that following the Township‟s abandonment of its December 
2004 charges against him, there is a lack of documentation in the record of poor job 
performance.  Thus, Carlson appears to argue that because those disciplinary charges 
were not continued, the Township cannot rely on any evidence relating to those charges 
in its explanation for his termination.  However, he does not offer sufficient support for 
this assertion.   
The Township presented legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons through the sworn 
affidavits and testimony of Township Committee members about why Carlson was 
terminated.  The evidence regarding his termination also included Carlson‟s July 2004 
notice of a complaint of hostile work environment (App. at 386); the documented 
December 2004 disciplinary charges that were brought against Carlson; a July 2004 
memorandum (from then-Deputy mayor Richard Harris, advising him to consult the 
Township Code Book pertaining to his duties) which stated, “I am asking you to review 
this because of the meeting we held yesterday (July 1, 2004) and your interpretation that 
the Committee does not have the authority to make requests or provide direction as to 
how your department is run,” (App. at 241); the transfer of two of his employees, Jon 
Finlaw and Bobby Fleckenstein, to other units; and Carlson‟s objection to the August 26, 
2005 meeting in his grievance letter.   
Although Carlson asserts that his alleged harassment of Mr. Hinchman and of 
certain employees in 2003 and 2004 and his alleged resistance to being closely monitored 
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by the Committee in his performance of responsibilities as raised in the discontinued 
2004 disciplinary proceedings “would not justify” his September 2005 termination, that is 
not the proper inquiry.  Carlson‟s disagreement does not suffice to show pretext.  See 
Billet v. CIGNA Corp., 940 F.2d 812, 825 (3d Cir. 1991) (“The fact that an employee 
disagrees with an employer‟s evaluation of him does not prove pretext”), overruled in 
part on other grounds by St. Mary‟s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).  
Finally, Carlson claims that the Township changed its reasons for his termination 
from the time of its response to the EEOC charge to the instant lawsuit, and contends that 
this is evidence that the Township‟s proffered reasons are pretext.  In its response to 
Carlson‟s EEOC charge allegation that he was subjected to disciplinary charges prior to 
being removed from his position as Superintendent, the Township stated that “[the 2004 
disciplinary] charges lodged against [Carlson] were not in temporal proximity to the non-
renewal of his contract and his removal.  The two events were nearly a year apart.”  (App. 
at 608.)   
Carlson claims that, in contrast, in the instant lawsuit, the Township relies in part 
on informal employee complaints lodged against him, some of which were allegedly 
raised before the December 2004 disciplinary charges abandoned by the Township 
following the March 17, 2005 hearing.  (Appellant‟s Br. at 28.)  The Township‟s 
recognition in its EEOC response of the fact that Carlson‟s disciplinary charges were not 
in temporal proximity to his removal acknowledges the length of time that passed 
 17 
 
between the charges and his firing.  That does not amount to an assertion that the 
Township found all allegations or complaints that led to the disciplinary charges to be 
untrue, or that it never relied on any of them in employment decisions about Carlson.  
Therefore, the Township‟s later use of, and reliance on, allegations made at the time of 
those charges is not a contrasting position.  Carlson‟s argument is unavailing. 
Furthermore, in its EEOC response in the context of Carlson‟s retaliation claim, 
the Township stated that it “had a legitimate non-retaliatory reason for its decision to 
remove [him] in conjunction with its decision not to renew his contract” (App. at 616), 
and stated its belief that as a contracting party, it “did not need cause or a hearing to 
effectuate its decision” once it had the required number of votes of the governing body.  
(App. at 617.)  The Committee‟s current position does not change the reason for 
terminating Carlson from that previously articulated in its EEOC response; instead, it 
presents additional reasons for the decision.  Cf. Smith v. Borough of Wilkinsburg, 147 
F.3d 272, 282 (3d Cir. 1998) (finding variation in employer‟s articulated reasons before 
the EEOC where it claimed that it did not renew plaintiff‟s employment contract because 
he failed to file an application, in contrast to trial, where employer emphasized his poor 
job performance).  We do not find that a reasonable jury could conclude that this was a 
shift in the Township‟s position.    
Carlson‟s proffered evidence, viewed collectively, does not support the reasonable 
inference of pretext required to survive summary judgment.   
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we find that Carlson has not provided sufficient 
evidence that would allow a reasonable fact finder to disbelieve the Township‟s 
articulated legitimate reasons or believe that invidious discrimination was more likely 
than not the motivating or determinative cause of the Township‟s termination of Carlson.  
See Sarulla, 352 F.3d at 799.  We therefore affirm the District Court‟s judgment.  Finding 
no error in the District Court‟s initial order granting summary judgment, we also find no 
abuse of discretion in the District Court‟s denial of Carlson‟s subsequent Motion for 
Reconsideration. 
